

# U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

---



**May 3, 2012**  
**Moscow, Russia**



# Agenda

---

- Ballistic Missile Threat**
- U.S. Policy on Missile Defense**
- Homeland Missile Defense**
- Regional Missile Defense**
- Addressing Russian Concerns**
- Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia**



# Ballistic Missile Threat Continues to Advance

- ❑ **Proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern and constitutes an increasing threat**
  - Proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction contribute to an unpredictable security environment
  - This security environment is marked by a persistence of regional conflicts and growing regional instability, as well as a broader and evolving set of opportunities and challenges
  
- ❑ **Threats continue to grow quantitatively and qualitatively**
  - Ballistic missiles allow rapid attack & WMD delivery
  - Shorter-range threats within key regions are growing rapidly: Iran, Syria, and North Korea possess 1000s of short- and medium-range missiles, potentially threatening to U.S. forces, allies, and partners
  - Long-range threat from North Korea and Iran still developing. North Korea tested ICBM/SLV in 2006, 2009, and 2012; Iran developing and testing Safir and Simorgh ICBM and/or SLV



*North Korean  
Taepo Dong-2  
ICBM/SLV*



**Iranian Ashura  
MRBM**

**Iranian Simorgh SLV shows  
progress in booster design that  
could lead to an ICBM**





POLICY

# U.S. Policy on Missile Defense


---

- ❑ **U.S. Homeland Defense: U.S. will defend against limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack**
  - System designed to support that policy: not scaled, intended or capable of defending the U.S. against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China
  
- ❑ **Regional Missile Defense: U.S. will defend deployed forces, allies, and partners in key regions**
  - Europe, Middle East, and Asia/Pacific
  - Tailored response to emerging ballistic missile threats
  
- ❑ **Expand international efforts: U.S. will work with allies and partners to provide pragmatic and cost-effective missile defense capacity**
  - U.S. seeks to create an environment where the development, acquisition, deployment and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred



# Homeland Missile Defense

- ❑ **Purpose: Protect the United States from limited ICBM attack by states like North Korea and Iran**
- ❑ **United States can defend the shaded areas using:**
  - Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California
  - Land-based radars in Alaska, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Greenland
- ❑ **U.S. remains committed to maintaining and improving the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system**
  - Prepared to adjust plans to stay ahead of emerging threats



**Defense Against North Korean ICBMs**



**Defense Against Iranian ICBMs**



# BMD Supports Regional Security and Stability

---

## ❑ Missile defense supports U.S. security objectives

- Helps to deter and defeat regional aggression by denying an aggressor the prospect of achieving its objectives with the use of ballistic missiles
- Provides a stabilizing presence with deployments and training exercises, supports partner interoperability, and builds partner capacity

## ❑ Missile defense enhances regional stability and security and contributes to deterrence by:

- Assuring allies and partners of U.S. commitment
- Countering ballistic missile coercion and WMD proliferation
- Providing protection if deterrence fails
- Reducing pressure for rapid escalation if deterrence fails



# Regional Missile Defense

---

- ❑ **Purpose: Defend U.S. deployed forces; protect allies and partners; enable allies and partners to defend themselves**
  
- ❑ **Missile defense is a key element of U.S. security commitments in Europe, Middle East, and Asia/Pacific**
  - Tailored to the unique geopolitical features of each region
  - Phased to the evolution and availability of U.S./Allied BMD capabilities
  - Adaptive to the scope and scale of current and emerging threats
  
- ❑ **Through cooperation, missile defense is more effective**
  - International cooperation, both bilateral and multi-lateral, is central to U.S. regional missile defense efforts



POLICY

# EPAA Not Directed Against Russia

## EPAA Elements:

### Phase 1 (Present):

Initial defense vs SRBM/MRBM

- TPY-2 Radar in Turkey
- MD ship presence
- SM-3 IA interceptor

### Phase 2 (2015 timeframe):

Enhanced coverage vs SRBM/MRBM

- Aegis Ashore site in Romania
- SM-3 IB interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

### Phase 3 (2018 timeframe):


Adds coverage vs IRBM

- Aegis Ashore site in Poland
- SM-3 IIA interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

### Phase 4 (2020+ timeframe):

Adds first layer capability vs potential Iranian ICBM

- SM-3 IIB interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence



Potential Threat Evolution



# Addressing Russian Concerns About U.S./NATO Ballistic Missile Defense

---

- ❑ **Russia has expressed concerns that U.S. missile defense systems, particularly Phases 3 and 4 of the EPAA, could undermine strategic stability**
- ❑ **U.S. continues to consult with Russia to directly address these concerns**
  - We have shared our assessment that the ballistic missile threat is real and growing
    - Thousands of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles; several states pursuing long-range missiles
  - We have explained the technical reasons why the EPAA cannot negate or undermine Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal
  - We have proposed extensive U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation



POLICY

# EPAA Cannot Negate Russia's Strategic Deterrent


---

- ❑ **EPAA is not positioned or designed to intercept Russian ICBMs**
  - Ships, land-based sites, and radars are positioned to defend NATO Europe and United States against missiles from Middle East, not ICBMs from Russia
  - This is true of all phases, including Phase 4, which will defend Europe and the United States against potential longer range missiles launched from Iran, not ICBMs from Russia
  - EPAA is limited in capacity – only a few dozen interceptors, not enough to affect Russia's strategic capabilities even if intercepts were possible
  - EPAA is capable against emerging Middle East missile threats, but is not capable against sophisticated countermeasures and multiple reentry vehicles such as Russia deploys
- ❑ **Interceptors in Europe cannot intercept Russian ICBMs**
  - U.S. missile defense system requires tens of seconds after threat ballistic missile burn out in order to generate a firing solution
  - U.S. interceptors are not fast enough to catch Russian ICBMs - would result in "tail chase"
- ❑ **Russia has large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal**
  - Well over a thousand deployed strategic warheads - land, sea and air delivered
  - Sophisticated countermeasures and multiple reentry vehicles
  - Many possible launch points for land and sea-launched ballistic missiles



POLICY

# EPAA Cannot Negate Russia's Strategic Deterrent



**EPAA Not Designed or Positioned to Intercept Russian ICBMs**



POLICY

# Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia is a Key U.S. Priority

## ❑ Operational benefits of U.S.-Russia cooperation

- Cooperation enables more effective and efficient defense
  - Data sharing and fusion allows improved early warning and interceptor performance
- Improves defense of all partners

## ❑ Political benefits of U.S.-Russia cooperation

- Gain insights into BMD plans and capabilities
- Enhance strategic stability
- Sends clear message that proliferation will not go unchallenged
- Build habits of cooperation that could flow to other areas

## ❑ U.S. and Russia have exchanged serious proposals

- Joint Analysis - to design a cooperative BMD approach and provide a greater understanding of our respective capabilities
- NATO-Russia BMD Centers - where we would combine sensor information and develop a common operational approach

**MD cooperation is the best way for Russia to gain confidence that the U.S.-NATO system will not negate or undermine its strategic deterrent**



# Conclusions

---

- The ballistic missile threat is real and growing, and it challenges NATO, Russia, and many other nations**
- To reinforce regional stability, the United States and NATO are deploying missile defenses adaptive to the threat**
- U.S. and NATO missile defenses are not oriented towards Russia, and they can neither negate nor undermine Russia's strategic deterrent**
- Cooperation is the best way forward and is in the interests of Russia, NATO, and the United States**
- Promising proposals are on the table and the pathway to increasingly robust cooperation is clear**
- U.S. and NATO look forward to a Russian political decision to cooperate**